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whose purpose is political promotion; a
pamphlet camouflaged within an historical
outline. In the collection of his materials,
the author has apparently chosen only
those writers and works whose theses and
data fit easily into one of the basic political
and promotional goals of his book. The
author then imposes upon the data and
quotations his political and promotional
interpretations and conclusions, and insin-
uates them into the text, which then
attempts to interpret history along the lines
of a fable.
We can and should approach this
book with a dose of humor. However, the
audience to which the book is directed -
young people, especially members of the
Bosnian Army - might well take seriously its
theses.  The bigger the fabrication, the eas-
ier for people to accept.  
Two basic »historic« theses are present-
ed as historical fact:
a. Since ancient times there has been a
special »Bosnian« people (ethnically
and religiously different than the neigh-
boring peoples) on the territory of
today’s Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its
real representatives are Bosnian
Muslims, original inhabitants of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, who until the
acceptance of Islam had a special reli-
gion - Bogomilism. Other peoples liv-
ing in Bosnia and Herzegovina are
merely alienated parts of the »Bosnian«
people who accepted Catholicism or
Orthodoxism, or else are »newcomers«
arriving in the early Middle Ages.
b. This special Bosnian people has a thou-
sand-year-old military tradition. With
their military and moral qualities, they
are superior to all other entities in the
area. They are more courageous and
have a stronger fighting spirit than oth-
ers, but have suffered throughout histo-
ry because of their honesty, and due to
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History of the Bosnian Army, by Dr. Enver
Imamoviæ, was published in 1999 by
Svjetlost, Fojnica, as part of the series
»Bosnian Roots«, with a printing run of
1000 copies.
I deliberately use the term publication
in order to avoid the words novel, outline
or the even more inappropriate term scien-
tific study, for this book is none of these.
Although History of the Bosnian Army
aspires to be an historical study, it is evident
at first sight that this is incorrect. The book
lists no references, and although the foot-
notes accompanying the text occasionally
provide sources for data, they are rarely rel-
evant scientific sources. As quotation
sources, the reader finds few relevant docu-
ments,  serious historical studies, or even
the names of acknowledged historians who
have researched the history of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and its neighboring countries.
Muslim authors are quoted predominantly.
While one may forgive the author, a
Bosnian Muslim, for his prejudices and
reluctance to include books and historical
studies written by acknowledged Croatian
and Serbian historians, it is unacceptable to
write about aspects of Bosnian history with-
out referring to respected historical best-
sellers such as History of Bosnia by Noel
Malcolm, Europe, a History by Norman
Davies or The Times Guide to the Peoples
of Europe.
One thus concludes that the author is
not interested in history, but only in its polit-
ical reinterpretation. This is a publication
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the conspiracies, schemes and betray-
als of others (Croats and Serbs). They
have always fought for others and have
repeatedly been ungratefully deceived.
The most prominent exponents of this
military tradition are Bosnian aghas
and beys, direct descendents of  thou-
sand-year-old noble families.
Rebuttals of these claims need not rely
on  Croatian historical literature. It is suffi-
cient to cite historical outlines in English,
intended for wider audiences. Here is what
the well known Times Guide to the
Peoples of Europe says about Bosnian
Muslims:
Bosnian Muslims are Slavic Muslims,
descendants of Serbs and Croatians
who converted to Islam during the peri-
od that Bosnia was under Ottoman rule
(1463-1878).  The national conscious-
ness of Bosnian Muslims is a recent phe-
nomenom; only with the creation of the
first Yugoslav state in 1918 did they
begin to identify themselves as a nation.
Muslims thoroughout Yugoslavia were
recognized in 1971 by the Communist
authorities as members of the »Yugoslav
nation« and therafter, many identified
themselves in the official census as
Muslims.  From 1992 on, the war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina contributed to
a strengthening of the Muslim national
consciousness. Prior to the war in BH
and the program of ethnic cleansing,
Muslims comprised 39% of the BH pop-
ulation.  Because the Bosnian Muslims
identify themselves primarily on a reli-
gious basis - their language and ethnic-
ity are the same as the non-Muslim
South Slavs - their national sentiments
became stronger as a result of historical
experience, especiallly after the fall of
the Ottoman powers.
It is often claimed that Islam gained
so many converts in BH because this ter-
ritory was a refuge for the Bogomils
(Christian heretics); however, the high
rate of conversion cannot serve as proof
of partial Christianization, since the
Albanians, who emphasized their firm
Catholicism, also converted in large
numbers to Islam when they hegemo-
nized by the Turks.  As followers of Islam
during the Ottoman Empire, the
Muslims in BH were spared participation
in the blood sacrifice (deversime), paid
fewer taxes, and had a greater degree
of self-administration than their
Christian and Jewish neighbors.  In
1878, Bosnia and Herzegovina came
under the Austrian protectorate.  The
Austrian minister who administered
Bosnia hoped to neutralize, or at least
establish a balance between, Croatian
and Serbian demands by promoting
»Bosnianism« and especially the
Bosnian nationality.  In post-war
Yugoslavia, Bosnia emphasized itself as
the most enthusiastic and »most
Yugoslav« republic.  After the proclama-
tions of Slovenian and Croatian inde-
pendence, Izetbegovic, as president of
Bosnia, proclaimed the independence
of BH in 1992. The Yugoslav Army,
under control of Serbia, initiated
aggression against BH and armed the
local Serbs, who then committed geno-
cide on the Muslims (and Croatians).
Parts of BH were »cleansed« of Muslims
and they live today almost exclusively in
Muslim-Croatian areas of the state. 
(excerpt paraphrased from The Times
Guide to the People of Europe, edited by
Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, London, 1994,
pp. 204-207)
If we compare this widely known and
scientifically indisputable quotation about
the Bosnian Muslims with what Enver
Imamoviæ has written, it is obvious that he
is reinterpretating history for political pur-
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poses in order to achieve the following
goals:
1. Encourage belligerence and instill mili-
tary pride in Bosniacs-Muslims.
2. Create a feeling of national superiority of
Bosnian Muslims over the other peoples
living in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
the neighboring countries.
3. Convince Bosnian citizens of their ethnic
homogeneity and indigenousness in
order to implement the idea of a unitar-
ian and mono-ethnic »greater Bosnia«.
There also exists in the book a dispro-
portion in the attention devoted to certain
historical periods. The prehistoric and
ancient periods are presented on 12 pages,
the Middle Ages on 25, the period of the
Turkish reign on 180 pages, and the period
of the Austro-Hungarian reign on 70 pages.
It is particularly striking that the period from
the end of World War One until 1992 is not
mentioned at all, and the period from 1992
until 1995 is described in only a few lines.
The period of history in which Bosnia was
part of the Ottoman Empire, i.e. the period
during which the Muslim element was dom-
inant, occupies a disproportionately large
part of the book. This is by no means acci-
dental; it indicates a tendency to associate
»real Bosnians« with Islam.
Claims about »Bosniacs« or Bosnian
Muslims being an indigenous people in
what is today Bosnia and Herzegovina and
parts of Croatia, and who are »superhu-
mans« - invincible warriors - are not consis-
tent with historical fact. By suggesting an
earlier origin of the Bosnian Muslims than
that of the other peoples in today’s Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Croatia, the author
attempts to create for them a privileged
position and promote their racial superiori-
ty over the »newcomers« of Slavic descent -
Croats and Serbs, and strengthen their
fighting spirit with the myth about »invincible
warriors«. Politically, this could serve as an
argument justifying a future reduction of
the rights of all peoples in Bosnia and
Herzegovina other than Bosnian Muslims.
The claims about the thousand-year-long
continuous existence of Muslim bey fami-
lies as direct descendants of the early
Middle Age nobility, and consequently as
holders of statehood, could well provide
the basis for a future political elite within a
unitarian Bosnia and Herzegovina.
After consideration of the theses and
claims of this book, one may now wonder
whether they might be the guiding princi-
ples for the creation of a great unitarian
Bosnia, a Bosnia which would extend over
the borders of today’s Bosnia and
Herzegovina.  If so, such political goals
could easily generate new conflicts in a
country whose continuance is guaranteed
only by the constitutiveness and equality of
the three peoples. Such conflicts may well
be the end goal of this book.
Predrag Haramija
Fikret Muslimoviæ (2000). 
W ar and Politics
Sarajevo: Bosanèica-print
pp.295
As the title indicates, Muslimoviæ’s book
deals with war and politics in Bosnia and
Herzegovina between 1993 and 1996,
from the point of view of one of the three
constitutive peoples in Bosnia and
Herzegovina - the Bosniacs - Muslims, and
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Unit one 
»Conception, strategy and the doctrine
of defense« comprises fifty pages and is the
only unit which lists a total of seventeen ref-
erences. The author first defines terms such
as defense conception, defense system,
strategy and doctrine of defense.
Security and defense he defines as a
function of state authorities, and then indi-
vidually analyzes the conception of security
and defense, the strategy of security and
defense, and finally the doctrine and sys-
tem of defense.
According to the author, »the concep-
tion of defense provides a solution to the
issues of organization and engagement of
internal potentials in the realization of par-
ticular political and defense-oriented
goals«.
He views the security strategy as falling
»between the conception of security and
the political goals to be achieved on the
basis of appropriate conditions and direc-
tions,« while the defense strategy forms »an
integral part of the security strategy.«
The defense doctrine is »a system of
acquired attitudes and views of the organi-
zation, preparation and use of armed
forces, and conduct of armed battles as a
fundamental and crucial form of war oper-
ations on the level of strategy, operative-
ness and tactics.«
The author further defines and analyzes
nine »areas of operation of a military
organization« where »the doctrine is orient-
ed towards providing various solutions.«
The defense system presents »the totality of
factors in the state and society that have a
defensive role, according to which tasks
are defined« for the armed forces, man-
agement and command, i.e., for the
»defense sector.«
He further directs his attention to the
defense system in the Federation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, »factors in the defense
provides a review of the events in the
region up until 2000.
The author was born on December 9,
1948, in the village of Rašljevo near
Graèanica (Bosnia and Herzegovina). He
graduated from the Military Academy in
1971, and from the High Military and
Political School in Belgrade in 1980.  In
1991, he left military school with the rank
of lieutenant-colonel in the Yugoslav
National Army(JNA), as a result of dis-
agreements with the actions of the leader-
ship in Serbia and the JNA.
Since the recognition of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina on April 8, 1992,
he was head of security at the Territorial
Defense Headquarters and advisor for mil-
itary issues in the Presidency of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1993, he
became head of the Administration for
Morale and, at the same time, was the
leading Bosniac representative at the Joint
Staff of the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense
Council.
From 1997 until 2000. he acted as
Deputy Minister for Defense Preparations.
On  April  1, 2000, he was retired with the
rank of Major General
Muslimovic has been a member of the
Party of Democratic Action, and from 1994
until 1996, was a member of its central
committee. He has published two books,
How they lied to us, and Defense of the
Republic and Aggression.
War and Politics comprises 295
pages and is divided into sixteen units, writ-
ten chronologically and covering the years
1993-2000.  Each of the units can be read
separately, independent of the previous
one. The book presents a collection of arti-
cles created in accordance with a particu-
lar strategic or current political issue.
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system in the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina«, »factor tasks« and »interac-
tive connections among the defense factors
in the Federation,« in relation with Annex 4
of the Dayton Agreement for Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Constitution of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
At the end of the unit, the author
describes particular military and political
organizations in their historical dimension
(NATO and the Warsaw Pact), with special
reference to the strategic role and signifi-
cance of NATO.
Unit two
»Special characteristics of endanger-
ment and defense of Bosnia and
Herzegovina« comprises thirty pages and
was written in Sarajevo in July 1996.  The
central issue of this unit is the defense of the
Bosniac (Muslim) people, and seen in that
light, the defense of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. As the author himself states
»the destruction of the Bosniac people and
the destruction of the state of Bosnia and
Herzegovina are not the enemy’s goals in
themselves, but are effects that are implicat-
ed if the final goal - the destruction of Islam
- is achieved.«
He presents three elements which
endanger Bosniacs: killing - genocide, urbi-
cide, abuse; and assimilation.  In his opin-
ion, the failure to organize components of
defense against the three afore-mentioned
elements of endangerment of Bosniacs
would be fatal. Islam occupies a central
place as the source of Bosniac defense
power. »A successful defense of Bosniacs as
a people and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a
state is only possible through a link of the
Bosniac people, its consciousness and its
behavior with its religion, Islam. Without this
link the survival of Bosniacs in this region is
impossible.« 
The author concludes that »the defense
interests and needs of Bosniacs do not con-
tradict, but assist, the defense needs of
Bosnian Serbs and Croats, and »the
defense organization of Bosniacs is based
on the Bosniac ideal of peace.«
Unit three
»Continuity of struggle for an integral
Bosnian state«, comprising 14 pages, was
written in Sarajevo in April, 1997. It is a
»content analysis of President Alija
Izetbegoviæ’s statements.« The issue per-
vading the entire analysis is why the
Bosniac leadership, headed by President
Izetbegoviæ, has been accused of the parti-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The
analysis attempts to address this issue by
presenting and explaining attitudes from
some of President Izetbegoviæ’s statements.
Unit four 
»The fighting morale of the defensive-
liberation forces during the aggression
against the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina«, comprising a total of 54
pages, describes the main characteristics
and the state of the fighting morale in the
Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina between
1990 and 1995. This unit actually presents
an analysis of the fighting morale of B&H
Army units in the defensive-liberation war
against the aggressor attacking the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
is a work product of the Administration for
Morale, headed by the author of this book.
The analysis is divided in two parts. The
first is entitled »Character, foundations,
goals, organization of work aimed at
development of the fighting morale in the
defensive-liberation forces in the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina«, and the other
is »Characteristics of the state of fighting
morale in the defensive-liberation war
against the aggressor attacking the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.«
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In the first part, characteristics of fight-
ing morale are analyzed, as well as the
foundations of the creation, goals, organi-
zation and work of experts in the develop-
ment of the fighting morale in the Army of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The second part analyzes the basic
characteristics of the fighting morale in dif-
ferent periods (1990, from 1991 until early
April 1992, from April 1992 until the end
of 1992, from early 1993 until early 1994,
and from early 1994 until the end of
1995). The above-mentioned periods refer
to the time before the armed aggression
against the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the initial period of the
aggression, the time of »activities against
aggressive military potentials of the
Republic of Croatia and military potentials
of Serbia and Montenegro«, and the peri-
od from the Washington Agreement up to
the Dayton Agreement.«
The state of the fighting morale in the
Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
author points out, was assessed on a daily
and weekly basis at the Administration for
Morale, and the results of the assessments
were used by »the President of the
Presidency and the Commander-in-Chief
of the General Headquarters.«
The author particularly emphasizes the
following influences on the fighting morale
in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
loss of manpower, military and profession-
al competence of commanders, influence
of the state authorities on the morale of
unit members, the attitudes of soldiers
towards the system of management and
command in the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the level of information
acquired by the soldiers, emotional and
rational attitude of soldiers towards the
aggressor, behavior of soldiers, stimulative
measures, motivation and readiness for
participation in military operations, and
faith and negative forms of behavior.
It should be pointed out that the devel-
opment of the fighting morale in the Army
of Bosnia and Herzegovina was an integral
part of functional responsibility for all man-
agement and command elements, from the
lowest level of lance-corporal to the
President of Bosnia and Herzegovina as the
Supreme Commander.
Unit five
»Principal evidence of aggression
against the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina« totals four pages and was
written in Sarajevo on May 22, 1998. It
lists eight facts which, according to the
author, provide evidence of aggression
against the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
The facts are as follow: international
recognition of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, direction of military activities
on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina from Belgrade, deploy-
ment of mobilized manpower from Serbia
and Montenegro for the execution of mili-
tary activities against the legal institutions
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
supremacy of the Serbian and Montenegrin
people over the Bosnian Serb leadership,
the »Tuðman - Miloševiæ« agreement, eth-
nic cleansing, and political and military
goals of Serbia and Montenegro for the
accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Unit six
»Some strategic aspects of the position
of the Bosnian liberation forces« consists of
eight pages and was written in Sarajevo on
June 3, 1995. It analyzes the position of
Bosniacs as a constitutive people in the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
relation to, the author states, (1) political
and military potentials of the greater-
Serbian aggression and (2) political
motives and activities of the leadership of
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the Republic of Croatia, who want to use
the political and military power of the legal
Bosnian authorities for the creation of cir-
cumstances in which the political position of
Bosniacs would be marginalized and even-
tual domination of Croats over Bosniacs
would be ensured.«
At the end, the author offers the follow-
ing solution: »A federation of non-national
cantons within the internationally recog-
nized borders of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina is the formula for the most
complete form of preservation of the
Bosnian state, and the equality of its peo-
ples and citizens.«
Unit seven
»The role of Bosnian Army officers and
the significance of armed combat compris-
es four pages and was written in Sarajevo
on  June 29, 1995. Its goal is to raise the
morale of officers in the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
The entire unit was written in the spirit of
the author’s initial thesis: »If we want to pro-
tect ourselves, if we want to save our fami-
lies, if we want to save the people, espe-
cially Bosniacs, and if we want to save the
state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the only
thing left is combat, armed combat against
the enemy, against the aggressor.«
Unit eight 
»Priorities in the strengthening of com-
bat potentials of the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina« comprises three pages, and
was created in Sarajevo on  July 27, 1995.
It was written in the same vein as the previ-
ous unit - strengthening of the fighting
morale. The following sentence speaks for
itself. »... we are wondering how to survive
... the answer is ... simple: we need to
fight.«
Unit nine
»Psychological propaganda of the
aggression forces and information activities
of the defensive-liberation forces during the
aggression against Bosnia and
Herzegovina« comprises 74 pages. It pro-
vides an account of the psychological
propaganda used during the aggression
against Bosnia and Herzegovina, and
opposed to it, the information activities »of
the defensive-liberation forces during the
aggression against Bosnia and
Herzegovina«.
In his account of the psychological
propaganda during the aggression against
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the author analyzes the characteristics of
greater-Serbian and greater-Croatian
propaganda. 
His starting point, later elaborated
through a series of units, is evident from the
following sentences: »During the prepara-
tions for the aggression against the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and at
its beginnings, a danger from greater-
Serbian propaganda was overtly manifest-
ed, while the greater-Croatian propaganda
was during that period covert, mostly with-
in regions that were being prepared for the
perfidious greater-Croatian aggression
against the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Together with the greater-
Serbian propaganda, the second half of
1992 sees an escalation of an ever more
overt greater-Croatian propaganda, inten-
sified with the attack of the Croatian Army
on the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which was preceded by the
organization of the Croatian Defense
Council, as a form of mobilizing Bosnian
Croats during the aggression.«
The author’s starting position in the
description of »greater-Serbian and
greater-Croatian« propaganda is that
aggressors against the Republic of Bosnia
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and Herzegovina were Serbia, Montenegro
and the Republic of Croatia. It is, therefore,
necessary to point out some of his conclu-
sions relating to greater-Serbian and
greater-Croatian propaganda:
»Since the creators of greater-Serbian
propaganda were aware that many Croats
felt the same prejudices and hatred
towards Bosniacs as did the Serbs, the
entire greater-Croatian propaganda, which
fulfilled both greater-Croatian and greater-
Serbian strategic appetites towards the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was
realized within the greater-Serbian propa-
ganda on the basis of the Tuðman-
Miloševiæ agreement aimed at achieving
greater-Serbian interests.«
...«The greater-Croatian propaganda
had the function of realizing greater-
Serbian interests.«
...«Because of the same goals (parti-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina and exter-
mination of Bosniacs), the greater-Croatian
and the greater-Serbian propaganda had
the same characteristics with regard to con-
ditions, substance, and methods of their
realization.«
Th author goes on to describe the
goals and the scope of »information activi-
ties« that had »the purpose of exposing ...
false claims, and proving that the aggres-
sor states were violating generally accepted
principles of international relations, by stat-
ing facts about the aggression of Serbia,
Montenegro and Croatia against the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.«
Finally, the author provides facts
regarding the substance of »information
activities« from the beginning of the armed
aggression until the end of 1992, during
1993, 1994 and 1995 up until the begin-
ning of peace negotiations in Dayton
(November 2, 1995).
Unit ten
»Special operations against the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina« com-
prises eleven pages and was written in
Sarajevo in August, 1995. Here the author
analyzes goals, sites, and scope of the spe-
cial operations against Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Bosniac people. He
pays particular attention to »the activities
prior to the escalation of the greater-
Serbian and greater-Croatian policies«,
»special activities of the greater-Serbian
and greater-Croatian policies in the period
shortly preceding the aggression against
Bosnia and Herzegovina,« and »special
activities during the armed aggression
against the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.«  The author concludes that
the »special activities« will continue with the
same goal as in the past, »in order to
destroy Bosniac political and statehood
particularities.«
Unit eleven
»What ‘Yugoslavia’ means in the
hands of greater-Serbian Nazis« comprises
two pages and was written in Sarajevo on
January 28, 1999. Using the example of
Montenegro, the author indicates that the
armed conflicts in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, those in Kosovo, and the
potential ones in Montenegro, exhibit the
characteristics of greater-Serbian aggres-
sion, rather than those of an internal con-
flict or civil war.
Unit thirteen 
»The importance of the Dayton
Agreement« comprises three pages and
was written in Sarajevo on November 22,
1995. In this article, the author analyzes to
what degree Bosniac interests were real-
ized, and emphasizes that »the Agreement
guarantees more than a minimum of nec-
essary conditions for a successful perspec-
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tive of Bosniacs.«
Unit fourteen
»The meaning of Tuðman’s statements
during the signing of the Paris Agreement
on December 14, 1995« is a one-page arti-
cle written in Sarajevo on  December 15,
1995. The author provides a critical analy-
sis of late President Tuðman’s statement,
considering that it »contains a series of mes-
sages arising from greater-Croatian goals
that deny Bosniacs as a people and Bosnia
and Herzegovina as a state.«
Unit fifteen
»An assessment of the current situation
regarding NATO’s use of military forces
against Miloševiæ’s regime« comprises five
pages and was written in Sarajevo on April
1, 1999. The assessment examines current
results of NATO air strikes directed at the
achievement of strategic goals; problems
created from the consequences of NATO air
strikes on targets in Yugoslavia; and proba-
ble directions in further development of the
situation in Kosovo and the entire region.
The author concludes that air strike results
are not sufficient, that NATO should inflict
more severe losses to Yugoslav Army man-
power, and that a stable political and mili-
tary organization of Albanians is the only
way to achieve the defeat of greater-Serbian
politics.
Unit sixteen 
»Strategic issues of security in
Southeastern Europe« is the last unit, total-
ing eighteen pages. In this article, the
author discusses the security aspects of
democracy and human rights, the return of
refugees, affirmation of co-existence and
the position of national minorities as the
most important issue of security and peace,
the significance of education, and other
security issues related to the Stability Pact for
Southeastern Europe, the Dayton
Agreement, demilitarization, the restoring
of balance, and so forth.
The beginning thesis is that democracy
is the fundamental issue of peace and sta-
bility in Southeastern Europe. He addresses
the relationship between democratic and
antidemocratic potential, and holds that
»the connections among antidemocratic
forces in different countries are far closer
than connections among democratic
forces.« The author also stresses that »dem-
ocratic forces in the Republic of Croatia
and Yugoslavia can contribute most to last-
ing peace and stability in the region.«
According to the author, the Stability
Pact for South Eastern Europe and the con-
sistent implementation of the Dayton
Agreement are the »path to peace and sta-
bility.«
He further analyzes the »new situation
characterized by the wish for Bosnia and
Herzegovina to access Partnership for
Peace and NATO,« and asks »whether
Bosnia and Herzegovina can maintain two
armies«, for »two armies in one country is a
source of instability, a source for endanger-
ing peace.« The solution is seen in the inte-
gration of »the military dimension of the
Bosnian state.«
Demilitarization of Bosnia and
Herzegovina is not realistic in the current
state of affairs, for in the author’s opinion,
the Bosniac people would thus »remain
unprotected.«  He maintains this to be a
good idea, but advocates a »rationalization
of military forces« and »maintaining of a
balance.«
The author sees the possibility for a
lasting peace and stability in the establish-
ment of a balance of military potentials, the
security policy of countries in Southeastern
Europe, »the balanced position of national
minorities« and »the balanced relations of
majority peoples towards their members in
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the neighboring countries.«
Based upon the above, the following
can be said about Muslimoviæ’s book, War
and Politics.
1) The author of War and Politics wishes
to act as a witness to a difficult period
in which the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was established and
defended. Regardless of his wish to be
an objective witness, the fact that he
was an active participant directly
affecting the development of events
precludes this. The author offers his
version of the truth between two sides -
good and evil. Two units, the first and
last, »Concept, strategy and the doc-
trine of defense« and »Strategic issues
of security in South-Eastern Europe«
respectively, differ from the others. All
other units exhibit a common trait:  the
author’s fear that »the theses could be
confused«, i.e. that an aggression was
not committed against the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and that the
conflict was a civil war. Therefore, there
is always an aggressor (Serbia,
Montenegro, Croatia, Croatian
Defense Council etc.) and a defender -
the Bosniac people. In this part, the
author often equates the destiny of the
Bosniac people with the destiny of the
state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2) The remaining two chapters do not
describe the past, but refer to the future
through a consideration of a potential
defense system in the Bosnian
Federation and the type of balance
needed in the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in order to establish a
lasting peace and stability. The greatest
disadvantage of the book is its lack of
connection among topics, and the
variety of methodological approaches
used in the analysis, induction, deduc-
tion, and description of problems. The
book offers neither an introduction nor
a preface, where the reader might find
information about the topic of the book
and its basic contribution. Therefore,
we recommend this book only as a col-
lection of the author’s views and a
treatment of the work of the
Administration for Morale regarding
the political needs for the motivation of
military units in the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina during the war, and his
recollections on the conception, strate-
gy and doctrine of defense in the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The author’s central focus is epito-
mized by a judgment given at the end
of the book that »the relation towards
territorial integrity, sovereignty and
political independence of Bosnia and
Herzegovina is of the most vital impor-
tance for the security in Southeastern
Europe.«
Simply put, the message of War and
Politics is:
The destiny of security in Southeastern
Europe depends on the destiny of the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a
state.  Therefore, security in Southeastern
Europe depends on the position of
Bosniacs as a people, and a state of
Bosnia and Herzegovina tailored to fit the
needs of the Bosniacs.
Miroslav Meðimorec
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Who is to blame for the situa-
tion in Bosnia and Herzegovina
- caught between history and
politics 
Two recently released books, one by
Mladen Ancic and the other by Dr.
Muhamed Borogovac, present the war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in widely divergent
manners.
The first, written by Mladen Ancic, a
young historian of Croatian background,
utilizes a wide array of credible materials to
provide an academic analysis, evaluation,
and possible resolution of the difficult
»Bosnian issue«.  The second book attempts
by means of unreliable evidence to superfi-
cially argue, repeat, and impose upon the
readers the »theory of betrayal« as the only
explanation for the failure of the concept of
a unitary, indivisible, democratic and civil
»Bosniac« Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Of course, the political and national
standpoints of the two authors are in com-
plete opposition. Ancic, a Croatian,
attempts valiantly to show that the only way
to resolve and satisfy the desires of all three
nations is to divide Bosnia and
Herzegovina, while Borogovac, a Bosniac
Muslim, considers this proposal a betrayal
which would cause the dissolution of the
state. Ancic draws his proofs from historical
sources and from the development of the
three national identities, while Borogovac
finds his arguments in the newly created
Bosnian myths about the »thousand year old
Bosnian state, religion, and military«, and
from the international recognition of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Ancic’s evidence is not
exclusionary; he speaks always of three
nations.  Borogovac, on the other hand,
refers only to one nation which has a right
to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Ancic attempts
to understand and justify the desires of the
Serbs, Muslims, and Croatians; he is more
tolerant in the exchange of views than Dr.
Borogovac, who is tolerant and democrat-
ic only toward those who agree with his
views on a unitary Bosnia. Others he con-
demns and would punish for opposing the
intolerance of a unitary state in which one
nation would rule, based on its overwhelm-
ing numbers. Ancic is prepared to discuss.
Borogovac is exclusionary and imposes his
theses.  There is a political willingness on
Ancic’s part for a resolution which would
guarantee all nations in Bosnia and
Herzegovina constitutional equality.  As an
indication of this willingness, he points out,
the Croatians have signed all resolutions
presented thus far ensuring such equality.
Borogovac calls into question all the signed
agreements, as they prevent, in his view,
the creation of a state in which one nation
would rule the other two.  
The most recent political developments
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in
the Federation, confirm that the crisis con-
tinues, and that there is wide opposition to
the pressure of the international communi-
ty and support for a lasting peace and a
resolution which satisfies all three nations,
unlike Borogovac, who in his book pro-
motes a unitary state. These developments
are a confirmation of Ancic’s bitter conclu-
sion that political resolutions continue to be
imposed, the free will of the nations is
being ignored, and there is a lack of intel-
ligent solutions for the crisis in the region. 
Mladen Ancic(1999). Who erred
in Bosnia-the gap between his-
tory and politics.
Political publications - Osijek,
Zagreb, Split. Pan Liber
Was it a war for the independence of
three newly emergent states - Slovenia,
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina - against
the aggression of the former Yugoslavia, or
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was it a civil war?  Mladen Ancic poses this
fundamental question in his book. In his
search for an answer, he considers the fact
that the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina did
not conclude with a victory or defeat for
any of the three parties (which gives cre-
dence to all three interpretations), and
attempts to come to a conclusion about
who actually erred in Bosnia.
Ancic, a young Croatian historian -
facts which are not insignificant in under-
standing his approach, methods, argu-
ments and conclusions - tries to respond
from a certain historical distance to the
obvious fact that the Bosnian issue, in
spite of the efforts of the entire world,  is
still not resolved, political responses to the
crises were not successful, and efforts of
world politicians were in vain.
By means of a thorough dissection in
which he uses strong historical documenta-
tion, he shows the impossibility of the
Dayton project and of any Bosnia based
upon the principle of force and the pre-
dominance of only one of its nations.
Ancic locates the roots of this Bosnian knot
in the history of Bosnia, and in the
omnipresent pejorative syntagma used by
foreign politicians, experts, and journalists
to explain an often incomprehensible and
unresolvable issue, i.e.: "the centuries-long
hatred" or "actions of the political elite
which brought the nations into conflict."
Through a series of chapters which
address and direct the basic question of his
research - "Between history and politics",
"civilization, history, and territory", "Era of
the clash of civilizations", "Three Bosnias",
"Who Erred in Bosnia", "Croatian role in
Bosnia", "How to Understand Bosnia",
"History Repeats Itself as a Farce", "Legend
of the Bogomils and Bosniak-Muslims", "In
the fog of Bosnian myths and legends" - he
investigates the historical dimension.
Ancic divides the issue into three areas:
interpreting the legal-state status and for-
mation of Bosnia-Herzegovina through his-
tory, the creation and articulation of collec-
tive identity and relations toward legal-state
territory (two areas in which he feels he is
most capable), and the third area, expla-
nation of the national customs and tradi-
tions (about which he is less qualified;
therefore, he does not enter into a more
detailed discussion of this topic).
With the thoroughness of an historian,
he collects historical facts with which he
can successfully show how Bosnia is
anchored by history to the past, and how it
determines the present and the future.
Today's political reality is rooted to the his-
torical, psychological, sociological, reli-
gious, cultural, and political past of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and no type of force,
artificial political theories, pressure, or
political "engineering" can change this fact
(just as the recent political develpments in
BH after the last elections confirm Ancic's
basic thesis on the need to recognize real-
ity; that is, create a political configuration
of the state which validates the will of all
three nations). 
Ancic addresses the responsibility held
by outside factors in extending Bosnia's
agony, and the stubborn efforts of the
world to reject the facts which arise from
the special historical-political development
of this geographical area upon which three
distinct national identities developed:
Bosniak, Serbian, and Croatian.  The obvi-
ous desire of these three nations for a
guarantee of their biological security (from
which flow all other national rights, free-
doms, and obligations) and a state config-
uration which would grant them this free-
dom has been, subsequent to the recent
actions during and after the elections,
rejected, attacked, and characterized as
"tribal, nationalistic, and exclusionary."
Ancic carefully and thoroughly discuss-
es and interprets Bosnian history from the
Middle Ages to the present day, and shows
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how the Ottoman invasion interrupted the
process of national identification and the
consolidation of those areas of the state
which were then known as the Bosnian king-
dom.  
Political development was thereby
frozen for four centuries.  Often cited is
Srecko Dzaja's research "Confessionality
and Nationality of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
pre-Emancipation Phase, 1463-1804 (R.
Oldenburg Verla, Munich, 1984, Sarajevo,
1993) in which he concludes that Bosnia,
after 1463, ceased to exist as a unified
political entity (though it was hardly that
prior to the Turkish occupation).  Four cen-
turies of Turkish rule brought to a halt all
processes of national emancipation until
1878.  Only the Franciscans passed on
their Catholicism, and the Orthodox church
promulgated the mythical strength of
Dusan's empire.
The Bosnian Muslims, who resided on
the edges of the empire, were entitled in the
period when the Ottomans were the
strongest, and when the Ottoman Empire
disintegrated at the beginning of the 19th
century, the Muslims, with their reawakened
desire for national identity, become its most
conservative element, and resisted reform
by armed rebellion (Dragon of Bosnia).
The Congress of Berlin, like Dayton
120 years later, placed Bosnia under an
Austrain protectorate.  The consequence of
this decision was that the Serbian and
Croatian nations, thus far disenfranchised,
allied themselves to their mother states of
Serbia and Croatia, then a part of Austro-
Hungary, while the Muslims rejected both
these options, choosing to maintain the
basic identity they have kept to the present
day.
Austro-Hungary used the policy of
"divide and conquer" to endorse the
Muslims and impede the desire of the other
two nations to unite with their mother states.
Neither the first nor the second Yugoslavia
was able to resolve this omnipresent issue
of inequality of two nations and one reli-
gion.  Tito finally resolved it by means of
the 1974 Constitution, in which Muslims
(on the basis of religion) are transformed
into Muslims (on a basis of nationality) in
order to put them between the Serbs and
Croats and, by means of their equal status,
attempt to save Yugoslavia (and at the
same time, Bosnia and Herzegovina). With
the reopening of the Bosnian Pandora's box
at the end of the 80s, the Yugoslav crisis,
and the war in the first half of the 1990s,
the suppressed national desires of the three
nations, (war brought about the Muslim-
Bosniak national identity), broke out, and
all attempts to reach a final resolution
failed. Two of the nations, the Serbs and
the Croatians, again sought assistance
from their mother states, while the Bosniaks
became the most fervent supporters of a
Bosnian unitary state, as they saw in this a
chance to reach their final goal:  a state in
which they would rule the other two nations
by their predominant numbers.  Bosniaks
now attempted to overcome the historical
discontinuity between Middle Ages Bosnia,
which barely had the attributes of state-
hood, and modern Bosnia and
Herzegovina by creating historical myths
and legends - about the state and its
Illyrian heritage, the existence of a continu-
ous military history, language, culture, and
religion (Bogomil). They hoped by this to
create the historical foundations for a polit-
ical resolution by which Bosnia and
Herzegovina would function as an inde-
pendent and autonomous state in which
Bosniaks, the only legal successors, would
predominate. 
Since the final resolution - a military
victory or defeat of one of the warring par-
ties - would have been contrary to the prin-
ciples of the new world order and the
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strategic interests of the great powers on
the territory of southeastern Europe, the
war was brought to a halt in Dayton.
At the same time, all the processes of
political affirmation of the three nations in
conflict were stopped and put on hold,
though they could peacefully have reached
a solution which validated their individual
political desires. In Ancic's view, the most
natural resolution would have been divi-
sion and, finally, free elections and resolu-
tion. 
It is the three nations in Bosnia and
Herzegovina which are affected most by
the delay and imposed political relations,
and are the only factors truly interested in a
lasting peace.  Ancic, in the broadest chap-
ter of his book, "Between history and poli-
tics" concludes that the war was a natural
and almost unavoidable result of political
events.  In their delayed national identifica-
tion, all three nations desired division and
a consolidation of their own territory, as
well as the setting of borders which would
guarantee their security.  Although some of
the earlier proposals offered by the interna-
tional community to resolve the crisis:
three republics, national cantons, were
closer to the wishes of the three nations, the
Washington and Dayton Agreements
ignored all of them.
The international factors attempted fur-
ther to impose a unitary, multi-ethnic, civil
Bosnia and Herzegovina, supporting in this
way the Muslim idea of one, indivisible
Bosnia and Herzegovina in which Bosniak-
Muslims would dominate the others by the
strength of their numbers.  Thus the insta-
bility was prolonged, an instability which,
according to Ancic, could be resolved, and
he shows how by paraphrasing Cato's say-
ing about Carthage; that is, that it should
be destroyed, but the verb "destroy" is
replaced by the verb "divide".  His para-
phrase goes thus: "Ceterum censeo
Bosniam esse partiendam."
On the basic question of who erred in
Bosnia in the conflict between Croatians
and Muslims, Ancic analyzes data from
both sides and concludes how the conflict
could have arisen. Alija Izetbegovic, and
the Muslims (who later became "Bosniaks")
refused to directly acknowledge the Serb-
Croatian conflict, and resisted joining
forces with the side which was under
attack. When they themselves were brutally
attacked and found themselves unpre-
pared, faced with defeat and biological
extinction, they then assumed the role of
victim-nation.  They began to emphasize
their national, religious, and cultural toler-
ance, and their civil and democratic orien-
tation, values which were acceptable and
understandable to the West.  Croatians
were characterized at every opportunity as
their opposite, nationally intolerant, pre-
pared to destroy the unitary state and form
pacts with the enemy.  The only step which
would have freed Croatians from the label
of "separatist" would have been their
acceptance of Muslim domination under
the auspices of a civil state. The thesis of
Croatians as the guilty party in the conflict
with the Muslims is rejected firmly by Ancic:
"the only agreement with the Muslim part-
ners which could have been reached in the
first war years (1991-1992) would have
been the complete surrender of the
Croatian side.  And nothing else!"
Ancic also touches upon Huntington's
thesis of the clash of civilizations. Ancic
sees a confirmation of Huntington's thesis
in the example of Bosnia, and particularly
the failed American policies which support-
ed the "victim" based on their principles of
idealism, morality, siding with the good,
resisting evil and therefore "de facto" assist-
ing in the creation of an Islamic state in
Europe.  He asserts that ignoring the latent
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danger from Islamic radicalism on the bor-
ders of Croatia was extremely dangerous,
and the rejection of the Croats and the
uncritical assistance to and enabling of a
possible Islamization of the Bosnian state
were strategically and politically incompre-
hensible.   
Ancic believes the only means for
resolving the current political "pat position"
in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a "revision
and adjustment of the Washington and
Dayton Agreements, on the basis of equali-
ty of all three nations.  This means that… if
the Serbs have a right to Republika Srpska,
then the same right applies to the Muslims
and the Croatians."  The precondition for
this, according to Ancic, is a "redefinition of
existing territorial arrangements, creating a
balance between two basic demands: a)
separate economic and defense capabili-
ties; and b) territorial and geographical
conditionality."
Both conditions require territorial
exchanges which would mean an unavoid-
able transfer of populations.  Ancic holds
that this resolution is less costly than new
bloodshed, and that it will be reached either
by a new round of negotiations or a new
war.  Ancic concludes bitterly that "the wise
person would opt for the former, but experi-
ence shows that intelligence was never the
predominant factor here."
This book will certain not appeal to the
creators of the current political projects in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, who will catego-
rize it as a nationalistic interpretation and
justification for Croatian policies toward
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The serious read-
er, however, will not reject the book,
because he will utilize history to evaluate
and attempt to resolve the issue of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and can find therein suf-
ficient facts, figures, and connections to
reach a richer understanding of the Bosnian
"dark land".  Ancic's historical arguments
foresaw today's political developments.  It is
difficult to oppose his proposals for the res-
olution of the Bosnian crisis and reject his
identification of those responsible for its
prolongation.  Due to inflexible political
facts, there is continuing opposition to the
current imposed political resolutions in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the refusal to
submit deepens the continuing instability,
and delays the entry of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and surrounding countries
into the family of European nations.
Dr. Muhamed Borogovac (2000).




»It’s high time to come to the aid of the
patriotic forces fighting against the
forces of betrayal and division of
Bosnia...I am writing this book in
haste, before it is too late, while it is
still possible to say NO! to the divi-
sion of our homeland....«  
Quote from the introduction to Dr.
Muhamed Borogovac’s book.
In a number of books which have
appeared in recent years about the war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, its causes, goals,
resolutions, and perpetrators, the Bosniaks,
including Dr. Muhamed Borogovac, have
created facts, distorted reality, and »invent-
ed myths and legends«, according to
Mladen Ancic (author of Who is to blame
for Bosnia), in order to legalize their polit-
ical desires for their own state.  In the event
that this goal should prove unattainable,
they attempt to accuse others of treason
and of dividing the state.
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This book represents another of the
hastily prepared interpretations of the recent
political history of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and its goal is to convince the readers that
a conspiracy and sellout of Bosnian interests
exist.  It is written in a superficial manner, is
poorly documented, and lacks credibility.
The author’s use of crass language seems
intended to cater to the tastes of the »lower
classes«.  The book is a consequence of the
political battle between various Muslim
political groups struggling for power and
position in a future state of Bosnia.  Dr.
Borogovac is a member of an opposition
group operating on a different continent,
and his political activities directed against
his country’s government appear tailored to
please the host country, and not to per-
suade his readers. The book sets the goal of
proving the thesis that conspirators and trai-
tors are endangering a unitary and sover-
eign Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The role of
chief conspirator and traitor is played by the
present, charismatic president of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic.  Facts
and events are either invented or analyzed
on the basis of invalidated theses.  The
proofs offered are impossible to verify, per-
ceptions are highly subjective, personal mil-
itary experiences are rarely provided, and
experiences of others are related second-
hand.  The book is intended as testimony,
but lacks an academic, persuasive explana-
tion of the war, and neglects the historical-
political influences. It follows the current
mode of books on the Bosnian issue, written
by native and foreign authors, who wish to
use their short-lived experiences and
engagements on former Yugoslav territory
to form evaluations, offer advice, and share
their feelings about a war which is incom-
prehensible to them and thus can only be
explained in very general terms (most con-
sider it a noble struggle based on atavistic
passions). 
Dr. Borogovac’s book reveals itself in
its intentions, language, and structure as a
book which has been written »on orders«,
as it indefatigably repeats certain basic
ideas about indivisibility, sovereignty, his-
torical opportunity, and so on.   The
Bosniacs are represented as the only nation
that opposes the division of the state, the
only nation capable of democracy and
building a civil society.  Borogovac further
states that, along with the two main ene-
mies, Serbs and Croatians, Alija
Izetbegovic and his cohorts have trans-
formed victories into defeats by signing
treasonous capitulation treaties and agree-
ments, dividing and giving away parts of
the state, and therefore depriving the
Bosniacs of their state, which belongs to
them based on God’s (Allah’s) decree and
historical rights. 
Dr. Borogovac is an educated mathe-
matician, who participated at the onset of
the war in the formation of the Army of
Bosnia and Herzegovina in Tuzla. Later he
fled in fear and uncertainty to Croatia, and
then to the United States, where he teach-
es college mathematics and is active as a
member of the Bosnian Congress, which
operates outside Bosnia. He is an oppo-
nent of Alija Izetbegovic and his policies,
which led to the Dayton Agreement and the
current blueprint for Bosnia and
Herzegovina.  Borogovac considers Dayton
and all other signed agreements a form of
capitulation, leading to the disappearance
of the state in which apparently only one
nation resides: Bosniacs. He holds that the
interests and existence of the »thousand
year long state and Bosnian nation« (sic)
have been betrayed, and unsystematically
utilizes alleged »evidence« to reveal the
pro-Serbian politics of Alija Izetbegovic,
which expose him as a false Muslim believ-
er, a declared Serb, and a Bosnian traitor.
The main basis for the right of the Bosniacs
to a state is, in his view, the international
recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina:  if
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the world has recognized the state, then it
exists as one state, one nation, language,
history, and culture.  He considers the
desires of the Serbs and Croats for equali-
ty nationalistic, because their civil equality
in Bosnia and Herzegovina is ensured by
Bosnian tolerance and openness.
Borogovac further argues that Bosnia and
Herzegovina, because of  Dayton and
other actions of Izetbegovic, has been
divided and no longer exists. Republika
Srpska is only a temporary entity; when the
right moment for secession arrives, it will
first secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina
and then join with the Serbian Republic of
Yugoslavia.  He finds the causes for the war
in the past, in the Second World War, when
Bosnia and Herzegovina was a victim of
nationalistic incursions. 
The same themes are constantly
repeated:  one state (unitary), in which the
most populous nation (Bosniacs), rules.
His goal is to appeal to the emotions of the
Bosniacs by means of the most simplistic
political messages, and to encourage them
to be exclusionary and radical as well. All
agreements and discussions on a state
framework satisfactory to all three constitu-
tionally protected nations are considered
traitorous and in violation of the interna-
tional principles prohibiting change of bor-
ders. The only solution, therefore, is a
Bosnian civil state in which one citizen has
one vote.  All the agreements, Washington
and Dayton and others, are capitulations
and invalid.  Everything should begin anew,
from the moment of recognition of Bosnia
and Herzegovina by the international com-
munity, as this represented complete free-
dom to create a Bosnian (Muslim) state.
Such a simplistic interpretation of the his-
torical-political situation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina cannot  be considered a seri-
ous analysis of more current Bosnia-
Herzegovinian history, but only as a super-
ficial, reader-friendly pamphlet in service of
political goals. The Bosnian Congress and
its members participated in the last elec-
tions and have joined the Alliance for
Change bloc. Borogovac’s book has
apparently served as election propaganda
material and not as a serious academic
investigation of the continuing burning




truth  1992 war diary
Sarajevo: RABIC Publishing Co.
pp. 348
Šiber’s 348 page book was published
by the Sarajevo-based RABIC publishing
company in the fall of 2000.  It discusses
prewar events, the beginning and course of
the war in Sarajevo and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and provides a summary of
the author’s role in these events. An
account is also given of the complex rela-
tions between the defenders of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who were of
different  religious and national back-
grounds, and the reasons for the creation
of the Croatian Defense Council, the
Patriot League, the Croatian Liberation
Forces (HOS), and the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The author also tries to iden-
tify reasons for the confrontation, and later
the restricted (but cruel) armed conflict
between members of the B&H Army and
the Croatian Defense Council. Various
documents, reports, and maps appended
at the end of the book serve as evidence of
authenticity and enhance the book’s docu-
mentary quality.
The book is based on authentic entries
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from the diary of Stjepan Šiber, M.A. in mil-
itary science, who in 1992 placed himself at
the disposal of the presidency of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the defense against the
aggression being perpetrated on Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He served as
Chief of Staff of the B&H Territorial Defense,
Deputy Commander of the Territorial
Defense, and later Deputy Commander of
the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The author relates his personal evalua-
tions of the reasons for and course of the
aggression of the so-called Yugoslav
National Army against the sovereign
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
describing the huge and sometimes insur-
mountable difficulties encountered in the
defense of individual and national freedoms
of citizens, and in gaining the independence
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
He also identifies and emphasizes his own
and other people’s delusions during the
struggle for the survival of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were often
caused by deceptions to which he himself
had fallen victim.
In his book, the author has made an
ambitious attempt to write the truth about
the “agonized, betrayed and deceived peo-
ple, people of different religions, political
and cultural orientations.” This quote from
the introductory part of the book identifies
Šiber as a man who believed in and defend-
ed a united, civil Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, a man to whom chauvinism
and extremism were foreign.
One must interpret the author’s intro-
ductory address to the reader in the same
context, where he describes the deceptions
and delusions as “a shameful betrayal, a
shameful history of sub-humans and inhu-
manity which needs to be severely con-
demned, but never forgotten.”
The book provides numerous excerpts
from the author’s conversations on the cru-
cial issues of the country’s defense and
future, as well as his impressions of his inter-
locutors and individuals from the political,
religious, military and civil segments of  the
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  For
instance, he relates conversations and
gives evaluations of specific actions of Alija
Izetbegoviæ, Cardinal Vinko Puljiæ, Ejup
Ganiæ, Alija Demustafiæ, Mate Boban,
Stjepan Kljuiæ, Mile Akmad iæ, Jovan
Divjak, Sefer Haliloviæ, Jerko Doka,
Tihomir Blaškiæ, Dario Kordiæ, Zlatko
Lagumd ija, Avdo Hebib, JNA Generals,
Kukanjac and Gver, Ismet Bajramoviæ-
Æela, Juko Prazina and others.
Particularly interesting are conversa-
tions, negotiations, and agreements with
UNPROFOR representatives deployed in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Generals
Nambijar, McKenzie, Razek, Morlion,
Simpson and others.
Despite the fact that the author some-
times loses objectivity in his approach to
the resolution of problems on military
cooperation between the B&H Army and
the Croatian Defense Council, I recom-
mend this book to the readers, because it
provides an understanding of the goals
and significant events which occurred in
the defense of freedom and sovereignty of
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Even though these political and military
events took place only recently, one can
observe that the author’s approach to the
defense of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was never implemented, as
the Dayton Agreement divided the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina into Republika
Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and
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